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ABSTRACT. This paper employs four measures of downward income mobility and 
1984--1986 PSID data to examine the extent and possible causes of downward 
mobility. Despite modest economic growth during this period, a substantial number of 
Americans experienced downward income mobility, roughly 5% to 20%. The majority 
of the downwardly mobile initially lived with a nonelderly, Caucasian, male, less- 
educated, working household head. Logit analysis indicates that the following factors 
significantly increase the odds of downward income mobility: Mate headship; minority 
headship; family dissolution; nest-leaving; and having a head who works in mining, 
construction, manufactu~mg, transportation, trade, or farming. The following factors 
significantly lower the odds of downward income mobility: Retaining the same house- 
hold head; having a college-educated head; having a head who works in a professional, 
technical, or operative occupation; and having a head in the finance, insurance, and real 
estate industry. 
INTRODUCTION 
Americans have generally assumed that their economic status would 
"naturally" increase over time. From World War II until the early 
1970s upward mobility was indeed a realistic expectation: Wages grew 
by 2.5% to 3% annually and real median family income doubled (Levy, 
1987). Furthermore,  families throughout the income distribution enjoyed 
these gains. I Since 1973, however, real wage growth has slowed to the 
point of stagnation and family income has grown more  unequal. In the 
1980s the growth in the inequality of wages, earnings, and family 
income accelerated (Levy and Murnane, 1992; Karoly, 1993). These 
trends have begun to make their mark on Americans'  sense of eco- 
nomic well-being. Academics and the popular press express concern 
that the middle class is disappearing (e.g., Thurow, 1987 and Strobel, 
1993) and that the "American Dream" is vanishing (e.g., Dentzer, 
1991). The prospects for upward income mobility seem to be dimming 
and Americans have begun to fear downward mobility. Did the changes 
in the growth and the dispersion of wages, earnings, and family income 
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merely slow the pace of upward mobility or have many Americans 
actually become downwardly mobile? 
On a personal level, downward income mobility inflicts both mate- 
rial and psychological hardship (Ehrenreich, 1989; Newman, 1988). 
On a policy level, many of the downwardly mobile become eligible 
for government assistance, increasing the claims on strained public 
resources. More importantly, the downwardly mobile reduce their 
consumption, savings, and investment. Such cuts by a significant 
proportion of the population could dampen overall economic growth. 
During the seventies and eighties economists and sociologists con- 
ducted many studies of poverty, but relatively few of the broader prob- 
lem of downward income mobility. Duncan (1988) and Burkhauser and 
Duncan (1989) present the only detailed analyses of downward income 
mobility. Both studies identify an individual as downwardly mobile if 
their family income-to-needs ratio fell by 50% or more at least once 
during the decade of analysis. Duncan and Burkhauser examine the 
relationship between downward mobility and age, gender, and "life 
events" (e.g., divorce and unemployment). 
The present study also uses large drops in the income-to-needs ratio 
to identify the downwardly mobile. We also examine the connection 
between downward income mobility and many of the same factors con- 
sidered by the earlier research, for example changes in fanfily composi- 
tion. In this sense, this paper updates the work of Burkhauser and 
Duncan. However, this study also expands upon their work. In addition 
to large drops in the income-to-needs ratio, we also use drops down the 
quintile distribution of real family income to measure downward 
mobility. Furthermore, this paper expands the analysis of the factors 
associated with downward income mobility to include race, education, 
region, occupation and industry. 
The previous studies cover more years and thus include the effects 
of the business cycle. We examine downward mobility over a short time 
period, 1984 to 1986. This shorter period controls for business cycle 
effects by focusing on one part of a cycle: An upturn. Many have 
considered whether a rising tide will lift all boats, we instead examine 
whether a rising tide keeps boats from sinking. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the literature on 
downward income mobility. The second section describes the data and 
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methodology. The next section reviews the recent trends in the distribu- 
tion of wages, earnings, and family income. These trends may suggest 
which groups are likely to be downwardly mobile. Section IV examines 
the characteristics of the downwardly mobile and contrasts them with 
the characteristics of the entire sample. Section V reports the fre- 
quency, or risk, of downward income mobility overall and then by 
demographic groups. The sixth section presents Logit analysis of the 
factors which significantly influence the likelihood of downward income 
mobility. 
The results show that a substantial minority of Americans, roughly 
5% to 20% depending on the specific measure, were downwardly 
mobile during the period 1984--1986 even though the economy 
experienced modest growth. The majority of the downwardly mobile 
lived in 1984 households headed by a nonelderly, Caucasian, married, 
working man. Individuals living in households whose head was male, a 
minority, unemployed, lacked a college education, or became the head 
of the household during the sample period face higher risks of down- 
ward income mobility. 
I. L I T E R A T U R E  R E V I E W  
Duncan et at  (1984) spend one chapter examining family income 
mobility over the period 1971--1978. They find substantial mobility 
throughout the quintile distribution of family income. Of particular 
interest, 31.3% of the sample individuals dropped at least one quintile 
and 11.3% dropped two or more quintiles over the sample period. 
Duncan (1988) examines downward mobility in terms of drops of 
50% or more in the real family income-to-needs ratio at least once 
during the period 1969--1979. He finds that approximately one-third 
of the sample individuals were downwardly mobile during this decade 
(Table I). 
Duncan (1988) focuses on eight major "life events" as likely causes 
of downward income mobility. Downward mobility was most frequently 
associated with: (1) becoming a household head or wife; (2) a decrease 
in hours worked by other family members; and (3) the household head 
becoming unemployed. Downward mobility was more frequent among 
those in the retirement and "nest leaving" cohorts. Lastly, the risk for 
280 PATRICIA K. SMITH 
TABLE I 
Summary of previous findings 
Study Downward Mobility Percent 
Study Period Measure Downwardly Mobile 
Duncan, 1967-79 Movement to a lower 29.7% of upper 
Smeeding, class (3 classes) fell to middle 
Rodgers 
(1991) 6.2% of middle 
fell to lower 
Duncan 1969-79 Drops in real family 33% 
(1988) income-to-needs ratio 
of 50% or more 
Duncan 1971-78 Movement down the 31.3% dropped 
et aI. quintile distribution at least 1 
(I 984) of real family income quintile 
Burkhauser 1974-83 Drops in real farrdly 
and Duncan income-to-needs ratio 
(1989) of 50% or more 
11.3% dropped 
at least 2 
quintiles 
25% 
Duncan, 1980-86 Movement to a lower 27.1% of upper 
Smeeding, class (3 classes) fell to middle 
Rodgers 
(1991) 8.5% of middle 
fell to lower 
w o m e n  was either the same or  higher than that  of  men  in all age 
cohorts .  
Burkauser  and D u n c a n  (1989)  use the same measure  to examine 
life-cycle patterns o f  downward  income mobili ty during the per iod 
1 9 7 4 - - 1 9 8 3 .  They  find that f rom age 26 to 65 w o m e n  face a higher 
risk o f  d o w n w a r d  mobili ty than do  men. The  risk for  w o m e n  is highest 
(34%) for  the age 46 to 55 cohort .  Men  in the age 66 and older  cohor t  
face the highest male risk (31%). 
The  authors  also find that the link between downward  mobili ty and 
family composi t ion  changes is s tronger for  w o m e n  than for  men.  
Divorce,  death of  a spouse, and the bir th of  a child seem mos t  strongly 
associated with women ' s  downward  mobility. L a b o r  market  events, 
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however, appear to have similar impacts on both genders. Downward 
mobility is most strongly associated with the head's unemployment for 
the 26 to 45 years old cohort and loss of hours due to retirement or 
disability for the 46 to 65 years old cohort. 
The most recent study which examines downward income mobility 
does so within the context of overall class mobility. Duncan, Smeeding, 
and Rodgers (1991) examine movement between three classes over the 
periods 1967--1979 and 1980--1986. They define the upper class as 
indMduals whose real family income-to-needs ratio is at least 6. The 
lower class is defined by a ratio of 2 or less. The middle class has 
income-to-needs ratios between 2 and 6. Drops from the upper class 
and drops from middle class constitute downward mobility in this 
study. 
The authors find that drops from the upper to the middle class 
became less frequent in the eighties than in the earlier period. However, 
drops from the middle to the lower class became more frequent. 
Younger families were more likely to drop from the upper to the 
middle class. African-Americans and female-headed households were 
more likely to fall from the middle class. 
II. D A T A  A N D  M E T H O D O L O G Y  
The data consist of persons present in the 1984 through t987 inter- 
viewing waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 0?SID). The 
1986 and 1984 interviewing waves contain demographic information 
for 1986 and 1984 respectively. The 1987 and 1985 interviewing 
waves contain information on income in the years 1986 and 1984 
respectively. Each observation is weighted by the 1987 individual 
probability weight. 2 
The analysis uses four measures of downward income mobility. 
Drops of one-third or more and drops of one-half or more in the real 
family income-to-needs ratio identify persons as absolutely downwardly 
mobile. 3 Drops of at least one quintile and drops of two or more 
quintiles in the distribution of real family income identify persons as 
relatively downwardly mobile. 4 
Note that downward income mobility in terms of any of these four 
measures does not necessarily imply poverty. Furthermore, absolute 
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and relative downward mobility may be driven by different forces. For 
example, assuming family size remains constant, if the mean of the 
family income distribution shifts downward, but the variance remains 
the same, we would observe absolute, but not relative downward 
mobility. 
Because family composition often changes the unit of analysis is the 
individual. To determine if an individual is downwardly mobile in the 
absolute sense, for example, we look at the real family income-to-needs 
ratio of the family of which the person was a member in 1984 and 
compare that to the ratio of the family of which the person is a member 
in 1986. 
III. R E C E N T  TRENDS IN WAGES,  EARNINGS,  
AND FAMILY INCOME 
Labor income accounts for the majority of family income, thus adverse 
changes in the labor market will contribute to downward mobility. 
Duncan, Smeeding, and Rodgers (1991) find that male earnings in 
particular play a major role in all class transitions. During the eighties 
the distribution of wages and earnings changed in ways likely to 
contribute to the downward income mobility of various groups. 
The growth in median wages for all workers began slowing in 1973 
and has been fairly stagnate ever since. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 
(1990) report that the average weekly male wage actually fell by about 
5% from 1970 to 1987. Also troubling is the acceleration of the growth 
in wage inequality, especially among men (Levy and Michel, 1991; Katz 
and Murphy, 1992). During the eighties low-wage male workers saw 
their average wage fall faster than other men's and faced increased 
unemployment. The college education premium grew rapidly, leaving 
less-educated men with diminished opportunities in comparison (Levy 
and Murnane, 1992; Katz and Murphy, 1992; Bound and Johnson, 
1992; Burtless, 1990). Furthermore, the wages of younger, less-educated 
workers declined relative to the wages of their older counterparts. 
These developments suggest that, ceteris paribus, younger, less-educated 
men and their dependents are more likely to be both absolutely and 
relatively downwardly mobile. 
Women's wages have generally increased over the last decade, 
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closing the male-female wage gap somewhat (Katz and Murphy, 1992; 
Karoly, 1993). This trend suggests that, ceteris paribus, women may be 
less likely than men to be either absolutely or relatively downwardly 
mobile. Karoly (1993) also finds that during the 1980s wages for low- 
wage women declined while the wages of high-wage women increased 
at a greater rate. Thus, low-wage and less-educated workers of both 
genders may face a higher risk of both absolute and relative downward 
income mobility. 
The distribution of earnings exhibits similar patterns: Overall stagna- 
tion accompanied by accelerating inequality (Karoty, 1993; Levy and 
Murnane, 1992). Median family income has grown slightly since 1979 
and the average family income-to-needs ratio increased by approxi- 
mately 10% from 1978 to 1988 (Burtless, 1991). Cancian et al. (1993) 
find that the largest portion of the rise in family income results from 
increased wives' earnings. However, the growth in family income has 
occurred mostly at the top of the distribution. From 1978 to 1988 the 
family income-to-needs ratio of those in the 90th percentile rose by 
about 23% while the ratio of those in the 10th percentile fell by 6.5% 
(Burtless, 1991). 
Increasing family income inequality itself is not a new phenomenon, 
but its acceleration is (Levy and Michel, 1991; Karoly, 1993). Also new 
is the failure of family income inequality to diminish during a period 
of economic recovery. Cancian, Danziger, and Gottschalk (1993) find 
that the rise in inequality from 1968 to 1989 is due in large part to 
increased inequality in husbands' earnings. They also report that ap- 
proximately one-third of the increase in family income inequality results 
from changes in family headship. 
These trends suggest that families towards the bottom of the dis- 
tribution may be more at risk of absolute downward mobility than are 
families at the top. In addition, individuals whose family changes 
headship (through divorce, for example) may be more at risk of both 
absolute and relative downward m_obility. 
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DOWNWARDLY MOBILE 
Table II reports the characteristics of the sample and of the absolutely 
downwardly mobile. The sample contains 264,849 probability weighted 
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TABLE II 
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fell by fell by 
> 33% > 50% 
Employment status of 
1984 household head: 
Working 75.2% 72,8% 73.7% 
Temp. not working 0.8% 1.9% 0.9% 
Unemployed 4.0% 5.0% 5.4% 
Retired 11.4% 9.7% 8.8% 
Keeping house 4.3% 6.3% 5.3% 
Disabled 2.7% 2.3% 2.2% 
Student 1.1% 1.2% 2.2% 
Workfare, jail, other 0.4% 0.8% 1.6% 
Change in headship: 
Same head 91.4% 82.2% 78.0% 
1984 wife became 
1986 head 2.6% 7.4% 10.2% 
1984 female head 
became 1986 wife 2.2% 1.4% 0.9% 
1986 head was neither 
head nor wife in 1984 3.3% 7.3% 10.3% 
Institutionalized husband 
in 1984 returns by 1986 0.6% 1.6% 0.6% 
Table reads: In 1984, 19.9% of the sample individuals lived in female-headed households 
and 80.1% lived in male-headed househoIds. Of those whose income-to-needs fell by one- 
third or more, 22.4% lived in female-headed households and 77.6% lived in male-headed 
households in 1984. 
cases (13,619 unweighted observations). The majority of the absolutely 
downwardly mobile began the period in households headed by a non- 
elderly, Caucasian, married man with a high school or less education. 
Over 70% of the downwardly mobile lived with a household head who 
was working in 1984, while 4% to 5% lived with an unemployed head. 
That so many of the downwardly mobile lived with less-educated, 
working men confirms the severity of the impact of the recent trends in 
the wages and earnings of unskilled men. The role of family composi- 
tion changes makes no appearance here --  most of the absolutely 
downwardly mobile lived in households headed by the same person 
over the sample period. In sum, the majority of the downwardly mobile 
lived in traditional, working families. 
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Comparing the characteristics of the sample to the characteristics of 
the absolutely downwardly mobile shows which groups are dispropor- 
tionately downwardly mobile. For example, persons living with a house- 
hold head who did not have a high school degree in 1984 make up 
25.4% of the sample, but account for 31.8% of those whose income-to- 
needs fell by 50% or more. Other groups which appear dispropor- 
tionately downwardly mobile include those with a 1984 household 
head who was single or not Caucasian, and those who experienced a 
change in headship. 
Those whose 1984 household head worked are only slightly under- 
represented among the downwardly mobile, while those whose heads 
were unemployed, keeping house, or in school are somewhat over- 
represented. The absolutely downwardly mobile appear to be distri- 
buted across regions much as is the general population. 
This analysis does reinforce prior findings regarding the role of 
family composition. Those whose family retained the same head 
throughout the sample period and those whose 1984 female head 
married by 1986 are under-represented among the downwardly mobile. 
Those for whom the 1984 wife became the 1986 head are dispropor- 
tionately downwardly mobile. Lastly, those persons whose 1986 family 
was headed by some one other than the 1984 head or wife are also 
disproportionately downwardly mobile. This last family composition 
change generally represents children leaving the nest to form their own 
families. 
Table III reports the characteristics of the relatively downwardly 
mobile. This analysis includes only members of the third quintile in 
1984. This restricted sample contains 52,953 probability weighted 
cases (2,580 unweighted observations). Analysis of quintile drops 
among all sample members produces questionable, if not misleading, 
results. For example, in the full sample female-headed households and 
African-Americans do not appear disproportionately relatively down- 
wardly mobile. This result occurs largely because these groups dispro- 
portionately fill the lower quintile and have nowhere to fall. 
The characteristics of the relatively downwardly mobile resemble 
those of the absolutely downwardly mobile with a few exceptions. First, 
the over-representation of persons whose household head was neither 
Caucasian nor African-American among those dropping two quintiles 
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TABLE 11I 
Characteristics of the relatively downwardly mobile 
Persons 
in third 




Gender of t984 
household head: 
Female 12.8% 12.8% 
Male 87.2% 87.2% 
Age of 1984 
household head: 
64 or younger 92,1% 9 t.5% 
65 or older 7~9% 8.5% 
34 or younger 40.5% 35.8% 
35 or older 59~5% 64.2% 
Race of 1984 
household head: 
Caucasian 87,6% 87.1% 
Afro-American 9.6% 11.2% 
Other 2.9% 1.7% 
Child (under age 
14 in 1984) 22.1% 18.0% 
Region in 1984: 
Northeast 22,7% 21.6% 
North Central 28.9% 26.4% 
South 29.3% 33.4% 
West 18.6% 18.5% 
AK, HI 0.2% 0.0% 
Foreign 0,2% 0.0% 
Marital Status 
of 1984 head: 
Married 81.2% 81.0% 
Single 6,8% 5.0% 
Widowed 3.7% 4.6% 
Divorced 6.6% 7.0% 
Separated 1.7% 2.4% 
Education level 
of 1984 head: 
Didn't finish HS 19.3% 28.0% 
High school only 22.9% 31.1% 
HS + training 20.9% 13.4% 
Some college 21.0% 20.0% 
College degree t 0.9% 5.5% 
Advanced/pro- 





























Table III (Continued) 
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Persons 
in third 
quintile in Felt I Fell 2 
1984 quintile quintiles 
Employment status of 
1984 household head: 
Working 82.9% 84.4% 76.2% 
Temp. not working 1.1% 0.5% 4.6% 
Unemployed 1.9% 0.7% 4.3% 
Retired 9.9% 11.5% 5.6% 
Keeping house 1.0% 0.4% 3.3% 
Disabled 2.1% 2.5% 2.1% 
Student 0.7% 0.0% 1.3% 
Worlffare, jail, other 0.4% 0.0% 2.6% 
Change in headship: 
Same head 93.7% 91.7% 76.5% 
1984 wife became 
1986 head 1.2% 2.9% 6.6% 
1984 female head 
became 1986 wife 2.1% 2.5% 0.2% 
1986 head was neither 
head nor wife in 1984 2.8% 2.6% 16.5% 
Institutionalized husband 
in 1984 returns by 1986 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 
Table reads: Of those persons in the third quintile in 1984, 87.2% lived in mate-headed 
households in 1984 and 12.8% lived in female-headed households. Of those who fell two 
quintiles, 79.4% lived in mate-headed households and 20.6% in female-beaded households 
in 1984. 
appears much more pronounced. Second, the regional distribution of 
the relatively downwardly mobile does not match the entire sub- 
sample's distribution as closely. Specifically, individuals living in the 
Northeast appear under-represented among the relatively downwardly 
mobile. Persons in the South appear over-represented among those 
falling one quintile and persons in the West and South appear over- 
represented among those falling two quintiles. Third, persons whose 
1984 head was elderly are not over-represented among the absolutely 
downwardly mobile, but are among the relatively downwardly mobile. 
How do the downwardly mobile differ from the other sample 
members in quantitative terms? Table IV reports the average charac- 
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TABLE IV 
Comparison of those whose income-to-needs felt 50% or more to those not downwardly 
mobile by this measure 
Sample Downwardly Not downwardly 
average mobile mobile 
Size of 1986 
family unit 3.20 2.97 3.21 
Change in size 
of family unit -0.09 --0.33 --0.07 * 
(1984 to 1986) 
Number of children 
in 1986 family 1.12 1.t0 1.12 
Change in number 
of children -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Change in real family 
income-to-needs +1.28 -11.8 +2.03 *** 
Change in real 
family income 
(1984 to 1986) +$1,164 -$31,746 +$3,073 *** 
Change in head's 
real labor income -$31 -$18,635 +$1,048 ** 
Change in wife's 
real labor income +$431 --$2,894 +$624 *** 
Change in head + 
wife's real asset +$269 -$7,326 +$7 I0 '*  
income 
Change in real income 
of other members +$2,674 +$526 +$2,799"** 
Change in real 
private transfers +$225 +$295 +$221 
Change in real 
public transfers +$170 +$253 +$165 
* Statistically significant difference at the 90% level. 
** Statistically significant difference at the 95% level. 
*** Statistically significant difference at the 99% level. 
teristics of those whose real family income- to -needs  ratio fell by  50% 
or more  to those no t  downward ly  mobi le  by  this measure ,  s The  average 
1 986 family size and n u m b e r  of chi ldren of the downward ly  mobi le  do 
not  differ significantly f rom those of the n o n - d o w n w a r d l y  mobile .  In  
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both groups family size and the number of children decreased slightly 
from 1984 to 1986. Apparently family size and the number of children 
are not driving downward mobility. 
The average financial experience of the two groups differs dramati- 
cally. The downwardly mobile enjoyed a higher average income in 
1984, $44160 versus $32 560, but then lost an average of $31 746 by 
1986. In contrast, those not downwardly mobile enjoyed a modest 
average increase of $3 073 over the period. The average real family 
income-to-needs ratio of the downwardly mobile fell by nearly 12, 
while the ratio of the others increased by 2. 
The largest factor in the decline of family income for the down- 
wardly mobile is the loss of the household head's labor income. This 
source of income fell on average by S 18 635 in the downwardly mobile 
group, accounting for the majority of the total decline in real family 
income. In contrast, the increase in the head's labor income in the non- 
downwardly mobile group accounts for only about one-third of the 
total change in their family income. 
The decline in the head and wife's asset income accounts for the 
second largest drop in the income of the downwardly mobile, averaging 
S7 326. In contrast, the asset income of the non-downwardly mobile 
increased by $710 on average. Similarly, the labor income of the wife 
decreased for the downwardly mobile and increased for the others. The 
income of other family members increased on average for both groups. 
However, the increase for the downwardly mobile was relatively small. 
Both groups received an increase in average public and private 
transfers from 1984 to 1986. The increase in transfers to the down- 
wardly mobile totaled $548 on average, hardly enough to compensate 
for their large income losses. Furthermore, the increase in transfers to 
the downwardly mobile do not significantly differ from the increase 
received by those who were not downwardly mobile. 
In summary, changes in the household head's labor income appear to 
drive downward mobility. The large drops in the head's labor income 
may result from a loss in hours worked, a decrease in wages, or a 
change to a lower-earning head. The transfer system offered little in the 
way of compensation to the downwardly mobile, the increase in public 
assistance received was quite small relative to the average earned 
income loss. 
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v. THE EXTENT AND RISKS OF 
DOWNWARD INCOME MOBILITY 
The previous section explored who the downwardly mobile are and 
what has happened to their income. We now consider the extent of 
downward income mobility. Table V reports the overalt frequency, or 
risk, of downward mobility and then the frequency by group. Again, the 
calculations for retative downward mobility apply only to sample 
members initially in the third quintile. Eleven percent of the full sample 
experienced drops of one-third or more in their family income-to-needs 
ratio, 5.5% experienced drops of one-half or more. Nearly one-fifth 
dropped a quintile and 5.3% fell two quintiles. 6 
Individuals living in female-headed households face a greater risk of 
both absolute and relative downward income mobility than do those in 
mate-headed households. In particular, persons in female-headed 
households are over 1.5 times more likely to drop two quintiles. Those 
with an elderly 1984 household head appear slightly more at risk of 
relative downward mobility. Those with a 1984 household head under 
age 35 appear less likely to suffer either absolute or relative downward 
mobility. 
By racial group, persons whose household head in 1984 was neither 
African-American nor Caucasian face the greatest risks of absolute 
downward mobility and of dropping two quintiles] In fact, their chance 
of falling two quintiles is over three times greater than that of African- 
Americans and is six times greater than the risk for Caucasians. Those 
with African-American heads in 1984 face the highest risk of falling 
one quintile. Those with a Caucasian head in 1984 face the lowest risk 
of downward mobility by all four measures. The changes in the distri- 
bution of income which occurred over this period seem to have espe- 
cially hurt racial minorities. Even so, 10% of those with a Caucasian 
household head experienced drops of one-third or more in the their 
income-to-needs ratio and nearly 20% dropped one quintile. 
The frequency of absolute downward mobility does not much vary 
across the regions of the continental United States. s Regional variation 
in the risk of relative downward mobility appears somewhat more 
pronounced. Persons in the South face the greatest risk of dropping 
one quintile, while those in the North Central region face the lowest. 
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TABLE V 
Frequency of downward mobility 
Full Sample Restricted Sample 
Income- Income- 
to-needs to-needs 
fell by fell by 










Age of 1984 
household head: 
64 or younger 
65 or older 
11.0% 5.5% 19.2% 5.3% 
12.4% 5.8% 19.2% 8.6% 
10.7% 5.4% 19.2% 4.8% 
11.2% 4.9% 19.0% 5.0% 
10,1% 5,6% 20,6% 8,7% 
34 or younger 10.8% 5.5% 16.9% 4.6% 
35 or older 11.2% 5.5% 20.7% 5.8% 





Child (under age 
14 in 1984) 
I0.2% 5,1% 19,1% 4.3% 
14.9% 7.0% 22,5% 8.3% 
17.9% 9.9% 11.2% 25.8% 
10.7% 5.6% 15.6% 4.0% 
Marital status 
of 1984 head: 
Married 10.6% 5.4% 19.1% 4.7% 
Single 10,0% 6.4% 14.1% 2,8% 
Widowed 14,3% 5.7% 23.7% 10,7% 
Divorced 13,3% 5,4% 20,3% 12,7% 
Separated 11.5% 5.9% 27.0% 7.0% 
Region in 1984: 
Northeast 10.0% 4.9% 18.2% 2.7% 
North Central 10.8% 5.6% 17.5% 5.8% 
South 11.9% 5.7% 21.9% 5.8% 
West 10.8% 5.5% 19.0% 6.8% 
AK,HI 22,4% 11,9% 0.0% 25.8% 
Foreign 19.1% 0,9% 0,0% 0,0% 
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Table V (Continued) 
Full Sample Resu'icted Sample 
Income- Income- 
to-needs to-needs Fell one Fell two 
fell by feU by quintile quintiles 
> 33% > 50% 
Educational level 
of 1984 head 
Didn't finish HS 12.5% 6.8% 27.8% 8.9% 
High school only 11.5% 4.7% 26.0% 4.9% 
HS + training I1.6% 6.4% 12.2% 6.3% 
Some college 9.5% 4.9% 18.2% 4.3% 
College degree 8.1% 3o6% 9.8% 0.9% 
Advanced/pro- 
fessional degree 11.0% 5.2% 7.3% 5.0% 
Employment status of 
1984 household head 
Working 10.7% 5.4% 19.5% 4.9% 
Temp. not working 26. t% 6.3% 8.2% 23.3% 
Unemployed 13.8% 7.3% 7.5% 11.9% 
Retired 9.4% 4.2% 22.2% 3.0% 
Keeping house 16.1% 6.7% 6.6% 16.9% 
Disabled 9.4% 4.3% 23.1% 5.5% 
Student 12.1% 11.3 % 0.0% 9.5% 
Work/are, jail, other 22.9% 22.9% 0.0% 34. 1% 
Change in headship: 
Same head 9.9% 4.7% t8.7% 4.4% 
1984 wife became 
1986 head 31.6% 21.5% 46.8% 29.8% 
1984 female head 
became 1986 wife 7.1% 2.3% 22.5% 0.5% 
1986 head was 
neither head nor 
wife in t984 24.7% 17.2% 18.0% 31.7% 
Institutionalized 
husband in 1984 
returns by 1986 31.0% 5.5% 29.8% 6.1% 
Table reads: 11% of all persons experienced income-to-needs drops of one-thkrd or more. 
Of those living in female-headed househo!ds in 1984, 12.4% experienced such drops. 
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Persons living in the West are the most likely to drop two quintiles and 
those in the Northeast are the least likely. 
Among the marital status categories, persons living with a married or 
single household head in 1984 face the lowest risks of experiencing 
declines of 50% or more in the income-to-needs ratio. They also exhibit 
the lowest frequencies of dropping two quintiles. However, these 
groups face fairly high likelihoods of dropping one quintile. Individuals 
whose 1984 head was divorced or separated generally face higher risks 
of both types of downward income mobility. 
Changes in household headship also influence the risk of downward 
income mobility. Persons riving in a family which retained the same 
head throughout the sample period generally face lower risks of both 
absolute and relative downward mobility. Those whose 1984 female 
head married by 1986 face the lowest risk of absolute downward 
mobility and of dropping two quintiles. Persons who rived in house- 
holds in which the 1984 husband and wife split and now live in the 
family headed by the former wife face the highest risks of both types of 
downward mobility. This result is consistent with Burkahauser and 
Duncan's (1989) findings for the 1970s. 
The increase in the returns to education appears to have made its 
mark on the risks of downward income mobility. Those whose house- 
hold head did not fimsh high school face the highest risks of both 
absolute and relative downward mobility. Those living with a college- 
educated household head face lower risks of downward mobility. Even 
so, 5.2% of those whose 1984 head held an advanced or professional 
degree experienced income-to-needs drops of one-half or more and 
7.5% dropped two quintiles. 
Living with a working household head in 1984 reduces, but does not 
efiminate, the probability of downward mobility. Over 5% of those with 
working heads experienced drops of 50% or more in their income-to- 
needs ratio and 19.5% fell one quintile. Those whose 1984 household 
head was unemployed, keeping house, temporarily out of work, or was 
in Workfare or jail face the highest risks of absolute downward 
mobility. These persons also face the highest risk of dropping two 
quintiles. 
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VI. L O G I T  A N A L Y S I S  O F  T H E  L I K E L I H O O D  O F  
D O W N W A R D  M O B I L I T Y  
The previous sections described who the downwardly mobile are and 
the extent of downward mobility. These analyses suggest probable 
causes, but do not formally isolate the factors which contribute to 
downward income mobility. This section uses Logit analysis to ascertain 
which of the probable factors significantly influences the likelihood of 
downward income mobility in a statistical sense. For the sake of brevity 
we restrict this analysis to the two more severe types of downward 
mobility: Drops of 50% or more in the income-to-needs ratio and 
drops of two or more quintiles down the distribution of real family 
income. 9 
The descriptive sections of this paper and previous studies of 
downward income mobility suggest that female headship, changes in 
family composition, and unemployment of the household head are 
positively associated with downward mobility. The observed variation 
in risk across groups suggests that race, age, education, and region may 
also play significant roles. Obviously, so will the number of children 
and the number of income earners in the family. The Logit analyses 
include all of these factors as explanatory variables. 
The term "downward moNlity" often conjures up the image of a steel 
or auto factory worker being laid off. Are the downwardly mobile 
generally blue-collar, production workers? In order to address this 
question the regressions also include explanatory variables which track 
the 1984 head's main industry and occupation as measured by three 
digit codes from the 1970 Census of Population: Alphabetical Index of 
Industries and Occupations (U.S. Department of Commerce and the 
Bureau of the Census). 
Table VI reports the Logit analysis of the probability of drops of 
50% or more in the income-to-needs ratio. The regression explains a 
small, but statistically significant proportion of the variation in the log 
odds of absolute downward income mobility° Education exhibits the 
expected effect: Living with a 1984 head who had not completed high 
school raises, while living with a college-educated head lowers, the 
probability of absolute downward mobility. Living with an elderly head 
lowers, while living with a young household head raises, the risk. Also 
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TABLE VI 
Logit analysis of the probability that real family income-to-needs drops 50% or more 
Independent Estimated 
Variable Coefficient B/SE 
Constant -3.2013"* -82.69 
1984 Head, no HS diploma 0.2427** 1 t.27 
1984 Head has college education -0.3472"* - 1 I. 11 
Elderly 1984 head -0.2280** -6.15 
Young 1984 head 0.1741"* 7.94 
Married 1984 head -0.3326** -9.27 
Minority 1.984 head 0.3104"* 13.02 
Female 1984 head -0.0593 -1.48 
Unemployed 1984 head 0.1910"* 4.15 
# of children, 1984 -0.0142 -1.83 
# of earners, 1984 0.0709** 6.51 
Real family income-to 
needs, 1984 (initial position) 0.0255** 35.35 
Region in 1984 (Chi-sq [5] = 110.18) 
Northeast -0.1265 ** -7.11 
North Central 0.0725** 5.13 
South 0.0251"* 1.88 
West 0.0119 0.63 
AK,HI 0.7361"* 5.65 
Foreign -1.6095"* -4.33 
Head's Occupation in 1984 (Chi-Sq.[ 12] = 496.85) 
Profess., technical, kindred -0.5310"* -10.34 
Manager, admin. (non-farm) -0.2083** -4.36 
Salesworkers -0.0391 -0.63 
Clerical and kindred -0.0168 -0.32 
Craftsmen and kindred -0.4460** -9.31 
Operatives (non-trans.) -0.5478** -9.99 
Transportation operatives 0.1083 1.94 
Non-farm laborers -0.3201"* -4.74 
Farmers 0.5944* * 4.08 
Farm laborers & foremen 0.9565** 6.20 
Service 0.0375 0.67 
Private household -0.6511" -2.33 
Not working for pay 0.8672** 6.30 
Head's Industry in 1984 (Chi-sq[12] = 508.66) 
Ag., forest., fish -0.1480 -1.11 
Mining 0.9512"* 10.41 
Construction 0.4608** 8.62 
Manufacturing 0.3774** 8.19 
Trans., comm., public util. 0.1656"* 3.09 
Wholesale & retail trade 0.1995"* 4.09 
Finance, insurance, real estate -0.1997"* -2.92 
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Independent Estimated 
Variable Coefficient B/SE 
Business & repair services 0.5973** 9.92 
Personal services -0.1254 -1.28 
Entertainment, recreation 1.0699"* 12.71 
l~ofessional & related 0.t214" 2.33 
Public administration -0.1102 -1.79 
Not working for pay -0.7254"* 5.35 
Headship (Chi-sq[41 = 4825.20) 
Same head 1984 & 1986 -0.0728** -28.42 
1984 wife heads 
1986 family t.6915"* 53.23 
1984 female head is 
wife in 1986 -1.0427"* - !  1.80 
1986 head was neither head 
nor wife in 1984 1.3909"* 45.44 
1984 institutionalized 
husband returns by 1986 -0.0487 -0A3 
R-squared: 4.8% 
Chi-sq[441 7,643.22 
* Statistically significant at 95% level 
** Statistically significant at 99% level 
as expected, living with an unemployed head increases the likelihood of 
absolute downward mobility. 
Marriage and stable family composit ion seem to produce  financial 
security. Having a married household head significantly lowers the odds 
of absolute downward mobility, as does retaining the same head. 
Furthermore,  when a female head marries, the likelihood of downward 
mobility drops. Lastly, like Duncan (1988) we find that living in a split 
off family, mainly persons "leaving the nest", increases the likelihood of 
absolute downward mobility. 
While those in female-headed households are disproportionately 
downwardly mobile, living in a female-headed household does not 
significantly increase the log odds of absolute downward mobility. In 
fact, controlling for other factors, female headship exhibits a negative, 
but statistically insignificant, effect on downward mobility. The absolute 
increase in average female wages over  the period helps explain this 
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result. This result suggests that being female in itself does not pose an 
economic risk, getting divorced does. 
This analysis does reinforce the descriptive finding that persons 
living with a minority household head face higher risks of downward 
income mobility. Even after controlling for gender, education, employ- 
ment, region, and initial economic status, living in a minority household 
significantly raises the likelihood of absolute downward mobility. The 
structural changes in the economy and the subsequent changes in the 
distribution of income clearly hurt minorities more. 
The regional variable exerts a statistically significant impact on the 
likelihood of downward mobilityJ ° Specifically, living in the Northeast 
in 1984 lowers, while living in the South and North Central regions 
raises the likelihood of absolute downward mobility. 
Because the wages and earnings of those already in the lower tail of 
the distribution have generally fallen, we would expect that those with 
lower income-to-needs ratios in 1984 would be more likely to be 
downwardly mobile. However, the results indicate just the opposite: 
Controlling for the other factors, the higher the 1984 income-to-needs 
ratio the greater the chance of absolute downward mobility. 
Both occupation and industry significantly influence the log odds of 
absolute downward mobility. Occupations (of the 1984 household 
head) which lower the likelihood include: Professional, technical, and 
kindred workers; Non-farm managers and administrators; Craftsmen 
and kindred workers; Non-transportation operatives; Non-farm laborers; 
and Private household workers. Only the occupations "Farmers" and 
"Farm laborers and foremen" significantly raise the odds of absolute 
downward mobility. This result can likely be traced to the "farm crisis" 
of the 1980s. 
Living with a 1984 household head in the "Finance, insurance and 
real estate" industry significantly lowers the probability of absolute 
downward mobility. Industries which significantly raise the likelihood 
of downward mobility include: Mining; Construction; Manufacturing; 
Transportation, communication, and other public utilities; Business and 
repair service; Entertainment and recreation; and Professional and 
related. The first three of these industries are commonly associated with 
blue collar jobs. Thus, blue collar workers do indeed appear to be 
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susceptible to downward mobility, however they are not alone. The 
remaining four industries contain many white collar jobs. 
Table VII reports the Logit analysis of the probability of dropping 
two or more quintiles down the distribution of real family income. 
Again, the regression explains a small, but statistically significant 
proportion of the variation in the log odds of downward income 
mobility. As in the case of absolute downward mobility, living with a 
college-educated head in 1984 lowers the probability of relative 
downward mobility. In contrast to the case of absolute downward 
mobility, living with a 1984 head who had not completed high school 
lowers the odds of relative downward mobility. The age and marital 
status variables also exhibit signs which differ from the previous regres- 
sion. Specifically, having an elderly or married 1984 head raises and 
having a young head lowers the chances of relative downward income 
mobility. 
The regional effects on both types of downward income mobility 
appear to be quite similar. The notable exception is that living in the 
North Central region in 1984 raises the odds of absolute downward 
mobility, but lowers the odds of relative downward mobility. The 
occupational categories exhibit the same signs in both regressions with 
two exceptions. Having a 1984 household head in the "Craftsman and 
kindred workers" and "Private household workers" categories lowers 
the probability of absolute, but raises the probability of relative downw- 
ard mobility. The effects of the various industry categories appear 
essentially the same in both regressions. 
VII.  S U M M A R Y  A N D  C O N C L U S I O N S  
Between 1984 and 1986 a substantial minority of Americans experi- 
enced downward income mobility despite a growing economy: 5.5% 
experienced drops of one-half or more in their family income-to-needs 
ratio and over 24% fell to a lower quintile in the distribution of real 
family income. The majority of the downwardly mobile initially lived in 
households headed by a nonelderly, Caucasian, married, less-educated, 
working man. Logit analysis indicates that the following factors signifi- 
cantly increase the odds of both absolute and relative downward 
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TABLE VII 
Logit analysis of the probability of falling two or more quintiles 
Independent Estimated 
Variable Coefficient B/SE 
Constant -3.4419 * * -72.43 
1984 head, no HS diploma -0.1248"* -5.18 
1984 head has college education -0.2557** -8.55 
Elderly 1984 head 0.2728** -6.62 
Young 1984 head -0.4381"* -17.14 
Married 1984 head 0.2164"* 4.82 
Minority 1984 head 0.0761"* 2.71 
Female 1984 head -0.2594** -4.94 
Unemployed 1984 head 0.7457** 12.37 
# of children, 1984 -0.2116"* -24.44 
# of earners, 1984 0.3764** 41.33 
Real family income-to 0.0201"* 31.93 
needs, 1984 (initial position) 
Region in 1984 (Chi-sq [5] = 326.67) 
Northeast -0.0833** -4.75 
North Central -0.0380* -2.51 
South 0.0289* 2.03 
West 0.0775** 3.96 
AK, HI 1.6633"* 16.24 
Foreign 0.7220** 5.45 
Head's Occupation in 1984 (Chi-sq [12] = 771.65) 
Profess., technical, kindred -0.1925"* -4.27 
Manager, admin. (Non-farm) -0.0009 -0.02 
Sales workers 0.3991"* 7.51 
Clerical and kindred 0.1379** 2.76 
Craftsmen and kindred 0.1217"* 2.95 
Operatives (non-trans.) -0.1865** -3.57 
Transportation operatives 0.7901"* 16.42 
Non-farm laborers -0.2347** -3.36 
Farmers 2.2085** 4.54 
Farm laborers & foremen 3.4490'* 7.03 
Service 0.0269 0.48 
Private household 1.4687"* -3.19 
Not working for pay -0.4457"* -4.13 
Head's Industry in 1984 (Chi-sq [12] = 381.33) 
Ag., forest., fish -2.9695** -6.26 
Mining 0.7032** 7.81 
Construction 0.1509"* 3.07 
Manufacturing 0.1912"* 4.73 
Trans., comm., public util. 0.3770** 8.21 
Wholesale & retail trade 0.1473"* 3.38 
Finance, insurance, real estate -0.4296** -6.55 
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Independent Estimated 
Variable Coefficient B/SE 
Business & repair services 0.4735** 8.44 
Personal services -2.1418"* --7.47 
Entertainment, recreation 0.5324** 6.02 
Professional & related 0.2857** 6.16 
Public administration 0.0694 t .26 
Not working for pay -0.0352 -0.34 
Headship (Chi-sq [4l = 6076.58) 
Same head 1984 & 1986 -0.1251"* -51.97 
1984 wife heads 
1986 family 1.5865"* 48.64 
1984 female head is 
wife in 1986 0.3965** 4.92 
1986 head was neither head 
nor wife in 1984 1.7249"* 59.58 
1984 institutionalized 
husband returns by t986 1.3676"* 18.76 
R-squared: 8.7% 
Chi-sq[44] 14,732.31 
* Statistically significant at 95% level 
** Statistically significant at 99% level 
income mobility: Male headship; minority headship; marital dissolution; 
nest-leaving; unemployment of the household head; having a household 
head who is a farmer or farm laborer; having a household head in the 
trade, mining, construction, or manufacturing industries, and having a 
higher  initial ratio of income-to-needs. The following factors signifi- 
cantly lower the odds of downward income mobility: Having a college- 
educated head; retaining the same household head; having a household 
head in a professional, technical, or operative occupation; and having a 
head in the finance, insurance, and real estate industry. 
The results suggest that education and labor market changes play 
critical roles in downward income mobility. Policies which curb the 
high school drop rate and encourage college attendance may help 
reduce downward mobility. Macroeconomic growth policies, especially 
those which enhance employment opportunities for young men, and 
training and relocation programs might also help reduce downward 
mobility. 
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A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S  
T h e  a u t h o r  t h a n k s  G r e g  D u n c a n  a n d  D e b r a  L a r e n  f o r  t he i r  a s s i s t ance  
w i t h  this  p ro j ec t .  
N O T E S  
However, the size of the gains over the income distribution was somewhat unequal. 
Those at the top gained more than did those on the bottom. 
z Validity studies of the PSID generally confirm that the weighted sample is representa- 
tive and that measurement errors in annual earnings are low (Bound et  al., 1989). For 
validity studies see Duncan and Hill (1989), Lillard and Waite (1989), and Becketti e t  
al. (1988). For general information about the PSID see Hill (1992). 
3 Real family income includes the labor earnings of all members, dividends, rent, 
interest, and public and private transfers. The family income-to-needs ratio is calculated 
by dividing real family income by the official poverty line (in real terms) for the family's 
size. We use the CPI-U-X1 to convert nominal income and need standards to real 
terms. 
4 Using a drop of one quintlle to measure downward mobility may overstate the 
severity of the drop. For example, if initial family income exceeds the quintile break by 
one dollar, the loss of S 1.01 in income would constitute a drop of i quintile. 
5 Because the PSID is a stratified and clustered sample the standard errors automati- 
cally generated by most software packages will not be correct. The tests reported in this 
table are based on corrected standard errors generated by the PSALMS routine in 
OSIRIS. 
6 Some of the observed downward mobility may be transitory. 
7 The "Other" group includes Native Americans, Asians, and Pacific Islanders. 
8 We omit discussion of risk differences for Alaska, Hawaii, and foreign counties as 
less than 1% of the sample resides in these regions. 
9 This analysis uses the full sample rather than only persons initially in the third 
quintile. We include the 1984 family income-to-needs ratio to control for the effect of 
initial position. 
10 The coeffidents reported for all of categorical variables are standardized to reflect 
de~ations from the category's mean effect. 
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